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Abstract—Boolean network tomography is a powerful tool to
infer the state (working/failed) of individual nodes from path-level
measurements obtained by egde-nodes. We consider the problem
of optimizing the capability of identifying network failures
through the design of monitoring schemes. Finding an optimal
solution is NP-hard and a large body of work has been devoted
to heuristic approaches providing lower bounds. Unlike previous
works, we provide upper bounds on the maximum number of
identifiable nodes, given the number of monitoring paths and
different constraints on the network topology, the routing scheme,
and the maximum path length. The proposed upper bounds
represent a fundamental limit on the identifiability of failures
via Boolean network tomography. This analysis provides insights
on how to design topologies and related monitoring schemes
to achieve the maximum identifiability under various network
settings. Through analysis and experiments we demonstrate the
tightness of the bounds and efficacy of the design insights for
engineered as well as real networks.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The capability to assess the states of network nodes in the
presence of failures is fundamental for many functions in
network management, including performance analysis, route
selection, and network recovery. In modern networks, the
traditional approach of relying on built-in mechanism to detect
node failures is no longer sufficient, as bugs and configuration
errors in various customer software and network functions
often induce “silent failures” that are only detectable from end-
to-end connection states [1]. Boolean network tomography [2]
is a powerful tool to infer the states of individual nodes of a
network from binary measurements taken along selected paths.
We consider the problem of Boolean network tomography in
the framework of group testing [3], [4]. The classic group
testing studies the following problem: given a set S of n
items, at most d of which are defective, the goal is to identify
the defective items through binary measurements taken on
subsets Si ⊆ S of items (i = 1, . . . ,m). The problem of
Boolean network tomography is analogous in that it is also
about determining defective items (failed nodes) of a large
set S (all the nodes) by performing binary measurements over
subsets of items (monitoring paths), where a measurement fails
if and only if at least one of the measured nodes has failed.
A significant difference from conventional group testing is
that in Boolean network tomography, the subsets used for
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tests cannot be designed arbitrarily, but must conform to the
structure of the network. In this regard, Cheraghchi et al.
have studied graph-constrained group testing in [5], where
testing items correspond to either edges or vertices of a graph
G = (V,E). The tests are represented through a so-called
testing matrix T , which is an m × n binary matrix, where
each row represents a path, each column a vertex/edge, and
the (i, j)-th entry an indicator that the j-th vertex/edge belongs
to the i-th path. Given the maximum number of defective
items, the goal of [5] is to design a testing matrix with the
minimum number of rows that guarantees the identification
of all the defective items, under the assumption that each
monitoring path can span any connected subgraph of G. In
practice, however, the monitoring paths are constrained not
only by the network topology, but also by the routing scheme
in the network and the endpoints of the probes.
In our work, we tackle the problem of maximizing the
number of nodes whose states can be uniquely determined
from binary measurements on a given number of monitoring
paths. We consider the problem under increasing constraints
about the network, from the routing scheme to the endpoints of
monitoring paths. Due to the inherent hardness in computing
the exact maximum value, we focus on deriving easily com-
putable upper bounds based on the structure of the testing
matrix. The bounds allow us to: (i) evaluate the room of
improvement for a given monitoring scheme in a specific
network setting, and (ii) extract rules for network design to
maximize the number of identifiable nodes in a general setting.
Although our bounds are derived for the case of a single
failure, we show that the bounds are also valid (but looser)
for the general case of at most k ≥ 1 simultaneous failures.
The main contributions of this work are the following:
• We upper-bound the maximum number of identifiable
nodes with a given number of monitoring paths, in the
following scenarios: (1) paths between arbitrary nodes
under arbitrary routing (Theorem IV.1); (2) paths between
arbitrary nodes under consistent routing (Theorem IV.2);
(3) paths from a single server to multiple clients under
consistent routing (Theorem V.1); (4) paths from multiple
servers to multiple clients with fixed/flexible assignment
under consistent routing (Theorems V.2 and V.3); (5)
paths between arbitrary nodes under partially consistent
routing (Theorem VI.1).
• We give insights on the design of topologies and monitor-
ing schemes to approximate the bounds, grounded upon
the bound analysis.
• We demonstrate the tightness of the upper bounds by
comparisons with the results of known heuristics [6] on
engineered as well as real network topologies.
2• We compare the bounds in different scenarios to evaluate
the impact of the routing scheme, the number of monitor-
ing paths, and the maximum path length on the number
of identifiable nodes.
II. RELATED WORK
Pioneered by Duffield [2], Boolean network tomography
has direct applications in network failure localization. The
early works focused on best-effort inference. For example,
Duffield et al. [2], [7] and Kompella et al. [1] aimed at
finding the minimum set of failures that can explain the
observed measurements, and Nguyen et al. [8] aimed at finding
the most likely failure set that explains the observations.
Later, the identifiability problem attracted attention. Ma et al.
characterized in [9] the maximum number of simultaneous
failures that can be uniquely localized, and then extended the
results in [10] to characterize the maximum number of failures
under which the states of specified nodes can be uniquely
identified as well as the number of nodes whose states can be
identified under a given number of failures.
The related optimization problems have also been studied.
The problem of optimally placing monitors to detect failed
nodes via round-trip probing was introduced and proven to be
NP-hard by Bejerano et al. in [11]. The work by Cheraghchi
et al. [5] aimed at determining the minimum number of
monitoring paths to uniquely localize a given number of
failures, under the assumption that any path can be monitored.
For monitoring paths that start/end at monitors, Ma et al. [12]
proposed polynomial time heuristics to deploy a minimum
number of monitors to uniquely localize a given number of
failures under various routing constraints. When monitoring is
performed at the service layer, He et al. [6] proposed service
placement algorithms to maximize the number of identifiable
nodes by monitoring the paths connecting clients and servers.
Our work also addresses the problem of maximizing the
number of identifiable nodes under failures. Unlike previous
work, we aim at establishing upper bounds based on general
information such as the number/length of monitoring paths,
the type of routing scheme, and constraints on the path end-
points. Besides the theoretical value, our results also provide
guidelines for network design to facilitate network monitoring.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We use lower-case letters to denote scalars and vectors
and upper-case letters to denote matrices. For a vector p, p|i
denotes the i-th element in the vector. For a matrix M , M |i,j
denotes the element in the i-th row and j-th column; moreover,
M |i,∗ denotes the i-th row and M |∗,j the j-th column of M .
A. Network Model
We model the network as an undirected graph G = (V, E),
where V is a set of n nodes, and E is the set of links.
Each node may be in normal or failed state. Without loss
of generality, we assume that links do not fail, as link failures
can be modeled by the failures of logical nodes that represent
the links. The set of all failed nodes, denoted by F ⊆ V ,
defines the state of a network, and is called failure set.
B. Observation Model
We assume that node states cannot be measured di-
rectly, but only indirectly via monitoring paths. Let P =
{p1, p2, . . . , pm} be a given set of m monitoring paths. Ac-
cording to the needs of the discussion, each path pi ∈ P
is represented as either a set of nodes pi, or as an ordered
sequence of nodes pˆi, from one endpoint to the other. The
state of a path is normal if and only if all traversed nodes
(including endpoints) are in normal state. We call the incident
set of vi the set of paths affected by the failure of node vi and
denote it with Pvi . We also denote the incident set of paths
of a failure set F with PF , ∪vi∈FPvi .
The testing matrix T is an m× n matrix, where T |i,j = 1
if vj ∈ pi, and zero otherwise. The j-th column of T , denoted
with b(vj) , T |∗,j , is the characteristic vector1 of Pvj . The
transpose of b(vj) is hereby called the binary encoding of vj .
Note that multiple nodes may have the same binary encoding.
C. Identifiability
The concept of identifiability refers to the capability of
inferring the states of individual nodes from the states of
the monitoring paths. Informally, we say that a node v is
1-identifiable, given a set of paths P , if its failure and the
failure of any other node w cause the failure of different sets
of monitoring paths in P , i.e. v and w have different incident
sets. This concept can be extended to the case of concurrent
failures of at most k nodes, where a node is k-identifiable in
P if any two sets of failures F1 and F2 of size at most k,
which differ at least in v (i.e., one contains v and the other
does not), cause the failures of different monitoring paths in
P , i.e. F1 and F2 have different incident sets.
He et al. in [6] formalized the concept of k-identifiability
that we reformulate as follows:
Definition III.1. Given a set of monitoring paths P and a
node vj ∈ V , vj is k-identifiable with respect to (wrt) P if for
any failure sets F1 and F2 such that F1 ∩ {vj} 6= F2 ∩ {vj},
and |Fi| ≤ k (i ∈ {1, 2}),∨
vi∈F1
b(vi) 6=
∨
vz∈F2
b(vz)
where with ”
∨
” we refer to the element-wise logical OR.
In the special case of k = 1, Definition III.1 implies the
following Lemma.
Lemma III.1. A node vi is 1-identifiable wrt P if and only
if b(vi) 6= 0, and ∀vj 6= vi, b(vj) 6= b(vi), i.e., its binary
encoding is not null and not identical with that of any other
node.
D. Bounding Identifiability
The set of monitoring paths P is usually the result of design
choices related to topology, monitoring endpoints, routing
scheme, etc. Given a collection of candidate path sets2 P under
1A characteristic vector of a subset S of an ordered set of n elements
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is a binary vector with ‘1’ only in the positions of
the elements of V that are included in S.
2For example, P may be the class of path sets of given cardinality, or paths
of a given length.
3all possible designs, the question is: how well can we monitor
the network using path measurements and which design is the
best? Using the notion of k-identifiability, we can measure
the monitoring performance by the number of nodes that are
k-identifiable wrt P , denoted by φk(P ), and formulate this
question as an optimization: ψk(P) , maxP∈P φk(P ).
Although extensively studied [11], [5], [12], [6], the optimal
solution is hard to obtain due to the (exponentially) large size
of P , and heuristics are used to provide lower bounds. There
is, however, a lack of general upper bounds. In this work we
establish upper bounds on ψk(P) in representative scenarios.
Knowledge of these upper bounds is key to understanding the
fundamental limits of Boolean network tomography, and gives
insights on network design to facilitate network monitoring.
We observe that if a node vi is k-identifiable wrt P for any
k ≥ 1, then vi is also 1-identifiable wrt P , which implies that
an upper bound on the maximum number of nodes that are 1-
identifiable is also an upper bound on the maximum number
of nodes that are k-identifiable, as stated below.
Lemma III.2. For any k ≥ 1 and any candidate sets of
monitoring paths P , ψ1(P) ≥ ψk(P).
Proof. Given the optimal choice P ∗ ∈ P achieving ψk(P), we
have ψ1(P) ≥ φ1(P ∗) ≥ φk(P ∗) = ψk(P), where the first
inequality is by definition of ψ1(P) and the second inequality
is by Definition III.1.
Therefore, in the sequel, we focus on bounding ψ1(P),
simply denoted by ψ(P), where we will replace P by specific
parameters in each network setting. We hereafter shortly call
the 1-identifiable nodes “identifiable” .
IV. GENERAL NETWORK MONITORING
We initially consider a generic network with a given number
of monitoring paths between any nodes. We analyze two cases:
(i) arbitrary routing, and (ii) consistent routing.
A. Arbitrary routing
1) Identifiability Bound: Under no constraints on the rout-
ing scheme, it holds the following bound.
Theorem IV.1 (Identifiability under arbitrary routing). Given
a network with n nodes and m monitoring paths, the maximum
number of identifiable nodes under arbitrary routing satisfies
ψAR(m,n) ≤ min{n; 2m − 1}.
Proof. By Lemma III.1, every identifiable node v has a dif-
ferent encoding b(v) 6= 0. The maximum number of different
encodings with m digits, excluding 0, is 2m−1. Therefore, the
smaller number between 2m−1 and the total number of nodes
n bounds the maximum number of identifiable nodes.
2) Tightness of the bound and design insights: The bound
in Theorem IV.1 is tight, as we can construct a topology with
m monitoring paths that meets this bound. Given n nodes, we
label min{n; 2m− 1} of them with m-digit binary encodings,
excluding 0, such that all the encodings are distinct. Then we
generate m paths such that path pˆi (i = 1, . . . ,m) is one of the
possible sequences of all the nodes v for which b(v)|i = 1.
Finally, we connect every two nodes v and w with a link
whenever there is a path containing the sub-sequence v, w.
An example of this construction is shown in Figure 1, for
m = 3 and n = 7.
Fig. 1. Network meeting the bound of Theorem IV.1 (arbitrary routing).
B. Consistent routing
1) Identifiability Bound: In the sequel, we assume that
paths satisfy the following property of routing consistency.
Definition IV.1. A set of paths P is consistent if ∀p, p′ ∈ P
and any two nodes u and v traversed by both paths (if any),
p and p′ follow the same sub-path between u and v.
We remark that routing consistency is satisfied by many
practical routing protocols, including but not limited to shortest
path routing (where ties are broken arbitrarily but deterministi-
cally). Note that this property implies that paths are cycle-free.
We define the path matrix of pˆi as a binary matrix M(pˆi), in
which each row is the binary encoding of a node on the path,
and rows are sorted according to the sequence pˆi. Notice that
by definition M(pˆi)|∗,i has only ones, i.e., M(pˆi)|r,i = 1, ∀r.
Lemma IV.1. Under the assumption of consistent routing, if
any two different rows of the matrix M(pˆi) are equal, then
the corresponding nodes are not 1-identifiable.
Proof. Under consistent routing, the path pˆi cannot contain
any cycle, so every row of M(pˆi) corresponds to a different
node. If two different nodes have the same binary encoding,
then by Lemma III.1, the two nodes are not identifiable.
Definition IV.2. A column M(p)|∗,k (k = 1, . . . ,m) of a path
matrix M(p) has consecutive ones if all the “1”s appear in
consecutive rows, i.e., for any two rows i and j (i < j), if
M(p)|i,k = M |j,k = 1, then M |h,k = 1 for all i ≤ h ≤ j.
Lemma IV.2. Under the assumption of consistent routing, all
the columns in all the path matrices have consecutive ones.
Proof. The assertion is true for M(pˆi)|∗,i since it contains
only ones. Let us consider column M(pˆi)|∗,j , with j 6= i.
Assume by contradiction that there are two rows k1 < k2
s.t. M(pˆi)|k1,j = M(pˆi)|k2,j = 1 but there is a row h with
k1 < h < k2 for which M(pˆi)|h,i = 0. Let v1, v2, and
vh be the nodes with encodings M(pˆi)|k1,∗, M(pˆi)|k2,∗, and
M(pˆi)|h,∗, respectively. Then the paths pˆi and pˆj traverse both
nodes v1 and v2 following different paths, of which only pˆi
traverses node vh, in contradiction with consistent routing.
Lemma IV.3. Given m = |P | > 1 consistent routing paths,
whose length is at most d∗ (in number of nodes), the maximum
4number of different encodings in the rows of M(pˆi) is equal
to min{2 · (m− 1), d∗}, ∀pi ∈ P .
Proof. While the number of rows of M(pˆi) is bounded by the
maximum length d∗, the number of different encodings can be
lower. Notice that first, column M(pˆi)|∗,i contains only ones,
second, for any column M(pˆi)|∗,j with j 6= i, it holds, by
Lemma IV.2, that it has a consecutive ones.
We say that column k has a flip in row r if M(pˆi)|r−1,k 6=
M(pˆi)|r,k. Due to Lemma IV.2 any column of M(pˆi) can have
up to two flips or it would create a fragmented sequence of
ones. In order to have a change in the encoding contained in
any two successive rows r−1 and r of the matrix M(pˆi), i.e.,
M(pˆi)|r−1,∗ 6= M(pˆi)|r,∗, there must be at least a column
that flips in r. The number of columns that can flip is m− 1
and each of them can flip at most two times. The number
of different rows that can be observed in M(pˆi) is therefore
upper-bounded by the smallest between the maximum path
length d∗ and 2 · (m− 1).
Fig. 2. Consistent paths identifying all nodes of the network.
Example: Figure 2 shows a case of consistent routing. The
four path matrices have columns with consecutive ones and
each column flips at most twice, so the number of different
rows is less than 2 · (m− 1) = 6. For instance, M(pˆ3) is:
M(pˆ3) =


flips b1 b2 b3 b4
0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0
2 1 1 1 0
3 1 0 1 1
4 0 0 1 1


We now give an upper bound on the number of identifiable
nodes under consistent routing.
Theorem IV.2 (Identifiability with consistent routing). Given
n nodes, and m > 1 consistent routing paths of length at most
d∗ (in number of nodes), the maximum number of identifiable
nodes satisfies:
ψCR(m,n, d∗)≤min
{
imax∑
i=1
(
m
i
)
+
⌊
Nmax −
∑imax
i=1 i ·
(
m
i
)
imax + 1
⌋
;n
}
,
where imax = max{k |
∑k
i=1 i ·
(
m
i
)
≤ Nmax },
and Nmax = m ·min{2 · (m− 1); d∗}.
Proof. By Lemma III.1, each identifiable node must have a
unique encoding. By Lemma IV.3, we can define an upper
bound on the number of different node encodings in the path
matrices M(pˆi), i = 1, . . . ,m as follows: Nmax = m ·min{2 ·
(m−1); d∗}. Nevertheless, in the above value of Nmax we are
counting multiple times the nodes that appear in multiple path
matrices. In fact, if an encoding b has k digits equal to 1, then
b appears among the rows of k different path matrices.
Fig. 3. An example of semi-grid graph
The number of distinct encodings is maximized when we
minimize the number of duplicate encodings and therefore
their number of ones. This is achieved when we have
(
m
1
)
different encodings with only one digit equal to 1, 2
(
m
2
)
with
only two digits equal to 1 (appearing in two path matrices),
and so forth, until the total number of encodings (counting the
duplicates) is Nmax.
More formally, let imax = max{k |
∑k
i=1 i ·
(
m
i
)
≤ Nmax}.
For each i ≤ imax, we have
(
m
i
)
encodings containing i
digits equal to 1s and appearing in i path matrices. Con-
sidering that the remaining Nmax −
∑imax
i=1 i ·
(
m
i
)
encodings
will have at least imax + 1 digits equal to 1 and thus ap-
pear at least imax + 1 times, the number of distinct en-
codings out of the Nmax encodings is upper bounded by:
ψCR(m,n, d∗) ≤
∑imax
i=1
(
m
i
)
+
⌊
Nmax−
∑imax
i=1 i·(
m
i )
imax+1
⌋
.
Considering also the bound of n we have the final bound.
2) Tightness of the bound and design insights: For certain
values of m, n and d∗, it is possible to design a network
topology that achieves the bound of Theorem IV.2. The
construction is suggested by the proof of the theorem, and
consists of creating a topology and routing scheme with
the maximum number of different binary encodings and the
minimum number of 1s. In the following we show such a
construction when n = 36, m = 8, and d∗ = 8. In this case,
ψCR =
(
8
1
)
+
(
8
2
)
+
⌊
0
3
⌋
= 36. We can obtain this maximum
identifiability by intersecting the paths so as to generate the
maximum number of dangling nodes traversed by a single
path, and all possible intersections of two paths. A topology
that meets the above bound is the half-grid in Figure 3. All
the nodes are identifiable with just 8 monitoring paths with
the following pairs of endpoints: (c1, h1), (c2, h1), (c3, h2),
(c4, h3), (c5, h4), (c6, h5), (c7, h6), and (c8, h7) and routing
as in Figure 3. The above construction can be generalized to
the case of any m provided that d∗ = m and n = m(m+1)/2.
We show in Figure 10 that in a more general setting, this
topology and routing scheme do not always meet the bound
of Theorem IV.2, but approximate it closely.
V. SERVICE NETWORK MONITORING
We consider a service network where we monitor paths
between clients and servers, under consistent routing in the
case of (i) single-server and (ii) multi-server monitoring.
A. Single-Server Monitoring
1) Identifiability Bound: Consider the scenario where a
single server communicates with multiple clients and we can
only monitor the paths in between. The number of paths m
5coincides with the number of clients, and all the monitoring
paths must share a common endpoint (the server).
We start by showing the special structure of the topology
spanned by the monitoring paths.
Lemma V.1. Under consistent routing, any monitoring paths
with a common endpoint r must form a tree rooted at r.
Proof. We consider any two paths pi and pj . Starting from r,
the next hops on these paths lead to either a common node or
two different nodes. In the latter case, the two paths cannot
intersect at any subsequent node v, as otherwise the two path
segments from r to v following paths pi and pj would violate
routing consistency. As this is true for all the paths, the paths
must form a tree rooted at r.
Given the number of paths m with maximum path length
d∗, we define the optimal monitoring tree as a tree with m
leaves and maximum depth3 d∗ − 1 that has the maximum
number of identifiable nodes when its root-to-leaf paths are
monitored.
Lemma V.2. If the maximum path length d∗ satisfies d∗ ≥
⌈log2m⌉ + 1, the optimal monitoring tree is a full binary
tree with m leaves4. If d∗ < ⌈log2m⌉ + 1, then the optimal
monitoring tree is a tree composed of ⌊ m
2(d∗−2)
⌋
perfect binary
trees5 with depth d∗ − 2, and up to one full binary tree with
depth at most d∗ − 2 and m mod 2(d∗−2) leaves, connected
to a common root.
Proof. Let us first consider the case of unbounded path
length. By contradiction, assume the existence of an optimal
monitoring tree that is not a full binary tree. Such a tree must
have at least a node u whose number of children is either (a)
strictly greater than two or it is (b) exactly one.
If (a), u has at least three children v1, v2 and v3. Let p1, p2
and p3 be the paths from these nodes to u, as in Figure 4. We
can build a new graph with an additional identifiable node x
as in Figure 5, by removing the links between u and v1, v2
and adding x as a parent of v1 and v2 and children of u. Node
x is identifiable as its encoding is different from the encodings
of the leaves v1, v2 and v3 and of the root u. If (b), u has
Fig. 4. Three children tree Fig. 5. Full binary tree
only one child v, as shown in Figure 6. If v is not traversed
by any path, or all the paths traversing u also traverse v, then
node v is not identifiable, and the removal of v from the tree
would not decrease the identifiability. If instead there is a path
p1 traversing both u and v, and a path p2 traversing u which
ends before reaching node v, then path p2 can be prolonged to
traverse a new node x added as a child of node u to increase
the identifiability of the topology, as shown in Figure 7.
3The depth of a tree is the maximum distance from the root to any leaf, in
number of links.
4We recall that a full binary tree is a binary tree where each node is either
a leaf or it has exactly two children.
5We also recall that a perfect binary tree is a full binary tree where all
leaves are at the same distance from the root.
Fig. 6. One child tree Fig. 7. Full binary tree
Notice that as long as the maximum path length is d∗ ≥
⌈log2m⌉+ 1 we can apply the previous discussion and build
an optimal full binary tree with up to m leaves and depth
⌈log2m⌉+ 1 (maximum distance from the root to the leaves,
in number of nodes). If instead d∗ < ⌈log2m⌉+1, the largest
number of leaves that can be obtained in a full binary tree
topology with depth d∗ − 1 is 2d∗−1 which is lower than the
number of paths m. Therefore, in such a case, the maximum
identifiability is obtained by creating the maximum number
⌊ m
2(d∗−2)
⌋ of perfect binary trees of depth d∗ − 2 and up to
one full binary tree (not perfect) with depth at most d∗ − 2,
connecting them to a same root, thus ensuring that the number
of nodes with either no children or two only children is
maximized.
Example: Figure 8(a) shows an optimal monitoring tree for
m = 7 and d∗ = 4, i.e. a full binary tree. Figure 8(b) considers
m = 7 but d∗ = 3, so the optimal monitoring tree is made of
3 perfect binary trees of depth d∗ − 2 = 1 and a full binary
tree of depth at most 1, connected to the same root.
(a) (b)
Fig. 8. Optimal monitoring tree:m = 7 and d∗ = 4 (a) or d∗ = 3 (b).
We derive the following bound for single-server monitoring.
Theorem V.1 (Identifiability for single-server monitoring).
Consider monitoring paths between a server and m clients
in a network of n nodes and maximum path length d∗. Then
the maximum number of identifiable nodes ψSS(m,n, d∗) is
upper-bounded by:

min {zfb(m), n} if d∗ ≥ ⌈log2m⌉+ 1,
min
{
n; 1 +
⌊
m
2(d∗−2)
⌋
· zfb(2
(d∗−2))
+zfb(m mod 2
(d∗−2))
}
otherwise,
(1)
where zfb(m) , max{0, 2m − 1} is the number of nodes in
a full binary tree with m leaves.
Proof (sketch). First, we show that in the optimal monitoring
tree described in Lemma V.2, all nodes are identifiable. Then
we show by induction that given a full binary tree with m
leaves, the number of nodes zfb(m) is max{0, 2m − 1}.
Finally, we use this result to count the number of nodes in
the optimal monitoring tree.
2) Tightness of the bound and design insights: Under the
constraint that monitoring paths have a common endpoint, for
any given number of monitoring paths m, maximum path
length d∗, and sufficiently large n, it is possible to design
6a network topology according to the structure of an optimal
monitoring tree, as described by Lemma V.2, with a number
of identifiable nodes equal to the bound in Theorem V.1.
In particular, if d∗ ≥ ⌈log2m⌉ + 1 the topology would be
a full binary tree as in the example of Figure 8(a), while if
d∗ < ⌈log2m⌉+ 1 the topology would be the composition of
⌊ m
2(d∗−2)
⌋ perfect binary trees of depth d∗−2, and a full binary
tree of depth at most d∗ − 2, connected to a common root, as
in the example of Figure 8(b).
B. Multi-Server Monitoring
1) Identifiability Bound: We now consider a multiple server
scenario where each server s (s = 1, . . . , S) has ms clients.
We analyze two subcases: (i) fixed client assignment, where
the number of clients ms for each server is predetermined,
and (ii) flexible client assignment, where the total number of
clients
∑S
s=1ms is fixed but the distribution across servers
can be designed. Following a similar approach as in the proof
of Theorem IV.2, we can bound the number of identifiable
nodes in each subcase as follows.
Theorem V.2 (Identifiability for multi-server monitoring with
fixed client assignment). Consider the paths between S servers
and ms clients for server s (s = 1, . . . , S) in a network of
n nodes, with maximum path length d∗. Let m ,
∑S
s=1ms
and m , (m1,m2, . . . ,mS). Then the maximum number
of identifiable nodes ψMS(m, n, d∗) is upper-bounded as in
Theorem IV.2, except that Nmax is specified by Nmax =
min
{
md∗;
∑S
s=1
[
(m2s + 3ms − 2)/2 + 2ms(m−ms)
]}
.
Proof (sketch). The proof follows the same arguments of
the proof of Theorem IV.2, but considers that some of the
monitoring paths share endpoints.
1) We observe that, according to Lemma V.1, the monitoring
paths form S trees intersecting each other.
2) By induction on the value of ms, we prove a bound on the
sum of the maximum number of different binary encodings
in the path matrices of a single server s. Considering the
only columns of the paths of the same server, let ℓk be the
maximum number of different binary encodings on the path
from a client node vk to service s, with k = 1, . . . ,ms.
Let Ls ,
∑ms
k=1 ℓk. It holds that Ls ≤ (m2s +3ms− 2)/2.
3) We prove that the total number of different
binary encodings in all the m paths (including
repetitions across different paths) is Nmax ,∑S
i=1
[
(m2i + 3mi − 2)/2 + 2mi · (m−mi)
]
. To prove
this, we consider the i-th tree individually (i = 1, . . . , S).
When only considering the mi columns corresponding to
the client-server paths of the i-th service, the path matrices
of the i-th tree have a maximum number of different
binary encodings NMaxi = (m2i + 3mi − 2)/2. Moreover,
in each of these path matrices, there are m − mi other
columns corresponding to client-server paths of the other
services. The sequence of bits of each of these columns
may flip twice, due to Lemma IV.2, which accounts for
2(m − mi) more column flips in each of the mi path
matrices of the i-th tree. Hence we have
Nmax ,
S∑
i=1
[
(m2i + 3mi − 2)
2
+ 2mi · (m−mi)
]
. (2)
4) We proceed as in the proof of Theorem IV.2, replacing
NMax with the righthand side of Equation (2).
The following theorem addresses a different case, in which
every client can be assigned to any server.
Theorem V.3 (Identifiability for multi-server monitoring
with flexible client assignment). Consider monitoring the
paths between S servers and m clients with arbitrary
client-server assignment in a network of n nodes, with
maximum path length d∗. Then the maximum number of
identifiable nodes ψMS(m,S, n, d∗) is upper-bounded as in
Theorem IV.2, except that Nmax is specified by Nmax =
min
{
m · d∗;m2(2− 32S ) + 3m/2− S
}
.
Proof. Let A be the set of possible assignments of m clients
to S servers: A = {m ∈ N|ms ≥ 0, and
∑S
s=1ms = m}.
The bound on the number of identifiable nodes in
the case of S servers and undistinguished clients can be
formulated as in Theorems IV.2 and V.2, where Nmax =
min
{
md∗; maxm∈A
∑S
s=1
[
m2s+3ms−2
2 + 2ms · (m−ms)
]}
.
In order to calculate NMax we address the optimization,
in the integer variables ms, of the objective function
f(m) =
∑S
s=1
[
(m2s + 3ms − 2)/2 + 2ms · (m−ms)
]
=
2m2 + 3m/2 − S − 3/2
∑S
s=1m
2
s (obtained by replacing∑S
s=1ms with m where possible), under the constraint that
m ∈ A. A relaxation of this problem leads to the following
solution: ms = m/S, ∀s = 1, . . . , S, and an objective value
of m2(2− 32S )+3m/2−S, which is an upper bound to f(m),
from which we derive the assertion of the theorem.
2) Design insights: In a setting in which the m monitoring
paths connect a given number of servers to their clients, the
maximum identifiability is obtained by letting the branches of
several server-rooted optimal monitoring trees intersect with
each other, while satisfying the consistent routing assumption
and the constraint on the maximum path length d∗.
While in the case of fixed client assignment to servers, the
number of leaves of each tree is predetermined, in the case of
flexible client assignment, the proof of Theorem V.3 suggests
that the highest identifiability is obtained through a uniform
assignment of clients to servers. In terms of topology design
this implies that the maximally identifiable topology would
require uniformly sized monitoring trees.
VI. DATA-CENTER NETWORK MONITORING
The last scenario is a data-center network where we monitor
paths between end-hosts. Data-center networks have unique
topology and routing properties that require dedicated analysis.
A. Half-consistent Routing
Typical data-center topologies are based on two or three
layers of homogeneous k-port switches arranged into tree-like
topologies. A common topology built of commodity Ethernet
switches is the fat-tree topology [13]. Recent works on data-
center design and optimization propose the use of fat-tree
topologies to deliver high bandwidth to hosts at the leaves
of the fat-tree, which requires spreading the pod’s outgoing
traffic uniformly to the core switches. A special instance
of a k-ary fat-tree together with a related addressing and
7Fig. 9. Routing inconsistency in a fat-tree
routing scheme is described in the work of Al-Fares et al.
in [14]. An example with 3 layers and k = 4 is shown in
Figure 9. The authors of [14] propose the use of a joint routing
and addressing scheme which violates the consistent routing
assumption in two aspects: (1) routes between different source-
destination pairs may not be consistent, (2) routes in different
directions between the same source-destination pair may not
be consistent either.
An example of two paths violating routing consistency is
given in Figure 9. The example highlights routing inconsis-
tency, as the path between the aggregation switches 10.1.3.1
and 10.3.3.1 can be different depending on the source and the
destination hosts.
In this scenario, while Theorem IV.1 is still valid, Theorem
IV.2 cannot be applied due to the lack of routing consistency
and symmetry. To address the lack of routing symmetry, in the
following we consider one-way monitoring paths, while we
address the lack of consistency by introducing the following
concept of half-consistency.
Definition VI.1. If a routing scheme guarantees that any path
pi ∈ P can be divided into two segments s1(pi) and s2(pi),
such that the property of routing consistency (Definition IV.1)
holds for the set P ′ = ∪pi∈P {s1(pi), s2(pi)}, then the routing
scheme is called half-consistent.
Observation VI.1. Any shortest-path routing scheme on a fat-
tree is half-consistent.
Proof. Let us call us(p) and ut(p) the source and the destina-
tion endpoints of p, and let us call the upper node um(p) the
node of p that is the farthest from the endpoints. Due to the
structure of the fat-tree, there is only a unique path s1(p) from
us(p) to um(p), and a unique other path s2(p) from um(p)
to ut(p). Therefore, for any two intermediate nodes on si(p)
(i = 1, 2), there cannot be any alternative path between them,
and the routing of these path segments is consistent.
B. Identifiability Bound
In the case of half-consistent routing (including routing in
fat-trees), the following bound holds.
Theorem VI.1 (Identifiability under half-consistent routing).
Given m (m > 1) monitoring paths of maximum length d∗ in
an n-node network, the maximum number of identifiable nodes
under the assumption of half-consistent routing ψHR(m,n, d∗)
is upper-bounded as in Theorem IV.2, except that Nmax is
specified by Nmax = m ·min{2m−1, 4 · (m− 1); d∗}.
Proof (sketch). The proof derives from the same arguments
of the proof of Theorem IV.2, but replaces the concept of
consistency with half-consistency as follows.
1) We prove that each column of any path matrix M(pˆi) has
up to two sequences of consecutive ones. This is due to the
half-consistency property which implies that each column
has two parts, each meeting the consecutive ones property.
2) We prove that the maximum number of different encodings
in a path matrix M(pˆi) is min{2m−1, d∗, 4(m−1)}. In fact,
the number of different encodings of M(pˆi) is bounded by
the maximum number of nodes d∗, and by the maximum
number of encodings of m − 1 digits (recall that the i-th
digit is always equal to 1). Additionally, by considering
each column of M(pˆi) separately we notice that besides
the i-th column which contains only 1s, any other column
can flip its value up to 4 times, two for each sequence of
consecutive ones. In order to have a change in the encoding
in any two successive rows r−1 and r there must be at least
a column that flips in r. Notice that the number of columns
that can flip is m − 1. As a consequence, the number of
different rows of M(pˆi) is upper-bounded by 4(m− 1).
3) We observe that the maximum number of different encod-
ings in m path matrices, is bounded by
Nmax = m ·min{2
m−1, 4 · (m− 1); d∗}. (3)
4) We proceed as in the proof of Theorem IV.2, replacing the
value of NMax with the value of Equation (3).
C. Design insights
The identifiability of a fat-tree depends on the topology
parameters k, ℓ and the number of paths m. In Section VII-D
we show that for a small number of layers ℓ, half-consistency
does not imply a notable increase in the upper bound on identi-
fiability compared with consistency. In contrast, in determining
a lower bound, we notice that an empirical choice of paths
that achieves good identifiability makes ample use of the half-
consistency property to enable the identifiability of the routers
at the upper layers of the fat-tree. Results are shown in Figure
17. General guidelines on how to optimize identifiability via
path selection in such topologies are left to future work.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the tightness of the proposed upper bounds,
we compare them with lower bounds obtained by known
heuristics on synthetic and real network topologies. Since the
bound in Theorem IV.1 is achievable under arbitrary routing
(see Section IV-A2) and loose otherwise, we show it once in
Figure 10 and we omit it in the rest of the evaluation.
A. Consistent Routing
We analyze the tightness of the upper bound in Theo-
rem IV.2 under consistent routing. Figure 10 considers a
network having a half-grid topology as in Figure 3, with 78
nodes arranged into 12 lines and 12 columns. It shows the
upper bound (UB) of Theorems IV.1 and IV.2 as well as a
lower bound (LB) obtained by placing monitoring endpoints
as in Section IV-B2. We vary the number of paths while fixing
the maximum length at d∗ = 12. We show the bound in Theo-
rem IV.1 to highlight the potential in improving identifiability
by relaxing routing consistency. For instance, regardless of
the topology and the monitoring endpoints, we see that if
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Fig. 11. Bound of Th. IV.2, varying
m and d∗ (network of Fig. 10).
the number of paths is 6, the routing is consistent, and the
maximum path length is 12, then the number of identifiable
node is no greater than 30, much smaller than the bound of
min{26 − 1, 78} = 63 obtained by Theorem IV.1 without the
constraints on routing and path length.
In Figure 11 we show, for the same network, how the bound
of Theorem IV.2 varies with the number of monitoring paths
m and the maximum path length d∗. For small values of d∗ the
bound has an almost linear growth with m. For larger values of
d∗ the bound shows two regions: an initial super-linear growth
for small values of m, and a linear growth for large values of
m. The figure also shows that while the number of paths m
has a major impact on the number of identifiable nodes, the
length of the monitoring paths has a significant impact only
when d∗ is small, and diminishing impact otherwise.
B. Single-Server Monitoring
Figure 12 shows two scenarios with different topologies.
The first scenario is a network of 95 nodes, connected as a
full binary tree with 48 leaves, with d∗ = 7 (in number of
nodes). The figure shows the increase of the optimal number of
identifiable nodes by varying the number of monitoring paths
having a common endpoint. By using 48 paths of maximum
length d∗ = 7 from the leaves to the root, it is possible to
identify all the network nodes. Notice that the optimal number
of identifiable nodes that can be obtained by varying server
location and placement of clients coincide with the value of
the bound of Theorem V.1. Lemma V.2 shows in fact that
for such a topology, the optimal identifiability is achieved by
placing the endpoints of the m different monitoring paths one
in the root of the tree and the others in a way that the paths
form a full binary tree topology.
For the second scenario we consider a stricter limit on the
path length d∗ = 3. We consider a tree topology where a
common root is connected to 24 binary trees of depth 1, for a
total of 48 leaves, and 73 nodes (this topology is constructed
extending the case of Figure 8(b) to connect 24 subtrees). In
this topology, by using 48 paths of maximum length d∗ = 3,
from the leaves to the root, it is possible to identify all the
nodes. Also in this case, the bound of Theorem V.1 is tight,
and coincides with the optimal, which is a tree of paths where
⌈m/2⌉ binary trees of depth 1 descend from a common root.
The Figure also shows that the values of the bound obtained
with Theorem IV.2, are considerably looser than those of
Theorem V.1. This is because the former considers any m
paths generated with any consistent routing scheme, while the
latter considers the additional requirement that the monitoring
paths share a unique common endpoint.
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Fig. 12. Bound for single-server monitoring (Th. V.1) - full binary tree for
d∗ = 7 (a), multiple binary trees connected to a single root for d∗ = 3 (b).
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Fig. 14. UB of Th. V.2 and LB of GD
[6], AT&T topology, d∗ = 4, varying
m and S (3 clients per server).
Figure 13 illustrates an experiment on an existing AT&T
topology mapped with Rocketfuel [15], with 108 nodes and
141 links. We consider a single server and a random placement
of m clients. We obtained a lower bound, called ”Random”,
by running 100 trials for each value of m and using the
largest number of nodes identified by client-server paths under
consistent shortest path routing. We then compare this value to
the upper bound given by Theorem V.1. As the figure shows,
the lower bound is not as close to the upper bound as in the
case of the engineered topologies in Figure 12.
C. Multi-Server Monitoring
In these experiments we also consider the AT&T topology
with 108 nodes and 141 links. We analyze the case of multiple
servers, each serving 3 clients. We increase the number of
servers and vary the number of clients accordingly. Figure
14 shows the upper bound of Theorem V.2 compared to a
lower bound obtained with the heuristic greedy distinguisha-
bility maximization (GD)6 proposed in [6]. Notice that this
heuristic finds a good approximation to the optimal number
of identifiable nodes in this problem setting. Although the
heuristic only optimizes server placement, while Theorem V.2
considers the optimal placement of servers as well as clients,
the experiment shows a good approximation of the upper and
the lower bounds when m is sufficiently small.
Figure 15 shows a comparison of the three bounds of The-
orems IV.2 (arbitrary sources/destinations), V.2 (fixed client
assignment) and V.3 (flexible client assignment) for the same
topology, where we vary the numbers of services and clients,
with a maximum path length d∗ = 20. In the figure, the
bound of Theorem IV.2 represents the special case of one client
6Note that GD requires client locations to be predetermined. Here we place
clients on some of the 78 dangling nodes, and then use GD to place servers.
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Fig. 15. UB of Theorems IV.2, V.2 and V.3, AT&T topology, d∗=20, S
servers, m clients - even (a) and uneven (b) distribution of clients to servers.
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
-2  0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14
# 
id
en
tif
ia
bl
e 
no
de
s
# paths m
Th IV.2, d*=25
Th IV.2, d*=15
Th IV.2, d*=5
Th VI.1, d*=25
Th VI.1, d*=15
Th VI.1, d*=5
Fig. 16. UB of Theorems IV.2 and
VI.1 - 100 nodes, varying d∗.
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16
# 
id
en
tif
ia
bl
e 
no
de
s
# paths m
Lower bound
Upper bound - Th VI.1
Fig. 17. UB of Th. VI.1 and LB for
a 4-ary fat-tree with 3 layers.
per server. We calculate the bound of Theorem V.2 assuming
first a uniform assignment of clients to servers, as shown in
Figure 15(a), and then an uneven assignment, which is shown
in Figure 15(b). For uneven assignment: in the case of two
servers, one server is assigned to 4/5 of the clients, while the
other to the rest 1/5; in the case of three servers, one server
is assigned to 3/4 of the clients, the second server to 3/16,
and the third server to 1/16. It can be seen that in the case
of even assignment of clients to servers, the two bounds of
Theorems V.2 (fixed client assignment) and V.3 (flexible client
assignment) give the same values. By contrast, in the case of
uneven distribution of clients to servers, Theorem V.2 gives a
considerably smaller bound than Theorem V.3, which assumes
an even distribution of clients to servers.
D. Data-Center Network Monitoring
Before considering the case of a specific fat-tree topology
we highlight that, given the small diameter (and consequently
small path length) that typically characterizes these topolo-
gies, we do not expect to see a considerable difference by
introducing half-consistent routing. We see that only with a
high number of layers, routing half-consistency plays a role in
optimizing identifiability. To this purpose Figure 16 evidences
the difference in the upper bounds of the case of a more
flexible half-consistent routing scheme considered in Theorem
VI.1, with respect to the case of consistent routing considered
in Theorem IV.2. It considers a general network with 100
nodes. The difference of identifiability between consistent
and half-consistent routing grows by increasing the maximum
length of monitoring paths as d∗ = 5, 15, 25, which in a fat-
tree would correspond to values of ℓ = 2, 7, 12.
In conclusion, we can affirm that for topologies with very
short diameter, such as in the case of fat-trees, having a higher
degree of freedom in routing (half-consistent routing) has a
significant impact on the identifiability of the network only
for a high number of layers.
We now consider the case in which monitoring is performed
along paths between hosts of a data-center network with a
fat-tree topology and the routing scheme proposed in [14]. In
Figure 17 we consider a 4-ary fat-tree with three layers and
study the tightness of the bound of Theorem VI.1. Due to the
high complexity in selecting the optimal monitoring paths, we
resort to an empirical selection of paths that give us a lower
bound on the number of identifiable nodes . It is interesting to
see that with only 16 monitoring paths we are able to monitor
all the 36 nodes of this fat-tree.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We consider the problem of maximizing the number of
nodes whose states can be identified via Boolean network to-
mography. We formulate the problem in terms of graph-based
group testing and exploit the combinatorial structure of the
testing matrix to derive upper bounds on the number of iden-
tifiable nodes under different assumptions, including: arbitrary
routing, consistent routing, monitoring through client-server
paths with one or multiple servers (and even or uneven distri-
bution of clients), and half-consistent routing. These bounds
show the fundamental limits of Boolean network tomography
in both real and engineered networks. Besides the theoretical
value of this analysis, we use the bounds to derive insights
for the design of topologies and monitoring schemes with high
identifiability in different network scenarios. Through analysis
and experiments we evaluate the tightness of the bounds and
demonstrate the efficacy of the design insights for engineered
as well as real networks.
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